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Advances in technology and science have always
presented challenges in applying constitutional search and
seizure law. In this context, the Supreme Court has
considered whether law enforcement may, absent a warrant,
eavesdrop on private telephone conversations1 and use radio
transmitters to track the public and private movements of
suspects.2 The Court has addressed whether the aerial
surveillance of land3 and the use of a thermal imaging device
to gather information about the inside of a home4 constitute
searches under the Fourth Amendment. Further, it has
tackled such issues as the legality of mandatory urinalysis for
*J.D., Saint Louis University School of Law, 2009. I am grateful to Professor
Eric J. Miller for his insightful comments and guidance. Thanks also to
Professor Adam Gershowitz for helpful comments and suggestions during the
revision process, and to Professor Orin Kerr for pointing me in the direction of
some of his recent analysis on the topic. Finally, special thanks are due to Chief
Judge Catherine D. Perry of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri, who sparked my interest in this topic long ago with a research project
and thought-provoking conversation. All opinions expressed are the author's
own.
1. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
3. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (discussing warrantless
surveillance of a partially covered greenhouse from a helicopter); California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (discussing warrantless surveillance of a field from
altitude of 1000 feet); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986)
(considering inspection of chemical plant's exposed equipment via aerial
photography).
4. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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high school athletes5 and chemical field-testing of suspected
drugs that have been seized by law enforcement.6
Yet as one court has appropriately observed, "[t]he
recently minted standard of electronic communication via e-
mails, text messages, and other means opens a new frontier
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that has been little
explored. '7 A quick glance at the edge of this new frontier
might reveal the following: the FBI's "Magic Lantern"
technology, a Trojan horse virus that remotely injects
surveillance programs onto a suspect's computer and records
every keystroke;' X-ray devices that allow law enforcement to
see through people's clothing;9 and police tracking of the
geographical location of a cellular phone (and its owner) by
obtaining the service provider's records without probable
cause or a warrant."0 There are countless examples, but all
hold at least one trait in common: Fourth Amendment
questions abound while legal precedent often lacks, leading to
tenuous conclusions.
This article explores a tiny thread of this vast new
frontier. In particular, it explores one intersection between
technology and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that has
ballooned in commonality, yet remains untouched by the
Supreme Court-the warrantless search of a cellular phone's
contents.
Law enforcement officers often search the contents of a
suspect's cellular phone without obtaining a warrant. In
response, defendants have challenged these searches in
recent years.1 The Government has defended the legality of
5. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
7. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 904 (9th Cir. 2008).
8. See Christopher Woo & Miranda So, The Case for Magic Lantern:
September 11 Highlights the Need for Increased Surveillance, 15 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 521, 521 (2002). The FBI also uses a surveillance device known as
Carnivore that tracks the email traffic of Internet service providers. See Daniel
J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1264, 1265 (2004).
9. Solove, supra note 8, at 1265 (citing Ivan Amato, Future Tech: Beyond
X-Ray Vision: Can Big Brother See Right Through Your Clothes?, DISCOVER,
July 2002, at 24; Guy Gugliotta, Tech Companies See Market for Detection;
Security Techniques Offer New Precision, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2001, at A8).
10. See, e.g., In re Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 384 F. Supp. 2d
562 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 255 (5th Cir. 2007);
United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *5 (N.D.
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warrantless cellular phone searches by way of various
exceptions to the warrant requirement, including, most
commonly, the search incident to arrest and exigent
circumstances exceptions. 12  Further, federal courts have
regularly upheld these searches, rarely invalidating them for
want of a warrant.
13
Many issues arise in considering the legality of a
warrantless search of an individual's cellular phone. Part I of
this article establishes a point of reference for analyzing
the issue by distinguishing between different types of
information. It distinguishes between information stored on
a cellular phone as opposed to data stored on a third-party
server, and it further differentiates between the various types
of information stored on a cellular phone. Part II analyzes
the implications arising from the search of a cellular phone's
"coding information." Part III considers the issues raised by
the search of a cellular phone's "content-based" information.
Part IV examines recent judicial decisions applying various
warrant requirement exceptions to the search of a cellular
phone's contents. It then proposes a new standard for
searching cellular phones incident to arrest. Finally, Part V
examines the move toward instruments, such as the iPhone
and G2, which appear more akin to personal computers than
telephones in terms of their functionality and capacity for
information storage. These newer devices create difficult new
Fourth Amendment problems for which there has been little
analysis in either the courts or academia. Part V further
proposes a different standard for searching these devices than
the standard proposed for older generation cellular phones in
Part IV of this article.
I. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN TYPES OF INFORMATION
Telephonic communication has long presented
constitutional privacy concerns. Originally, those concerns
revolved around various forms of electronic eavesdropping
by law enforcement. 14  Later, they expanded to include
information, such as telephone numbers, transmitted to
Cal. May 23, 2007).
12. See infra Parts IV.A-B.
13. See infra Parts IV.A-B.
14. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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phone companies as part of the process of connecting a call. 15
More recently, these privacy concerns have further expanded
with the advent of cellular phones and newer, more advanced
"smart phones." These cellular devices have changed the
landscape dramatically.
This article considers the private information-including
call lists, text messages, address books, and photographs-
actually stored on a cellular phone. Information stored on
third-party data servers presents different, yet equally
challenging, legal issues. While data on a third-party server
is often identical to information stored on a cellular phone
(i.e., the same call list or text message that is stored on the
phone), a government search of this information raises
unique questions, such as whether the service provider was a
"party" to the communication and whether a subpoena,
rather than a warrant, is a legal means of obtaining the
information.16
Data stored on an individual's cellular phone, on the
other hand, concerns a private container. When the
government seeks to access this information, the Fourth
Amendment governs the legality of such action. Searching a
cellular phone's contents not only raises search issues, but
also questions as to whether the phone's seizure was legal.17
Further, this data is clearly held by a party to the
communications, unlike the uncertainty regarding a third
party who owns a data server."8 While the character of the
information is the same in both scenarios, the different
location and possessor of the information give rise to different
questions, and potentially deviating outcomes. This article
considers the information stored on a cellular phone, leaving
server data for another occasion.
One important consideration regarding information's
15. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
16. See Posting of Orin Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/
posts/1196148513.shtml (Nov. 30, 2007, 18:45 p.m. EST) (citing WAYNE R.
LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 4.3(c) (3d ed. 2008)).
17. This article does not consider the issue of the legality of a cellular
phone's seizure, as the analysis of such a seizure does not seem to differ much
from the analysis that pertains to other types of containers and personal items.
Cf. State v. Washington, No. 47773-1-I, 2002 WL 104492 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan.
28, 2002) (holding seizure of a laptop incident to suspect's arrest legal, while
search of the laptop was illegal).
18. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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Fourth Amendment protection is whether it is information in
which the owner has a reasonable expectation of privacy.19
Under United States v. Katz, if a person holds a subjective
expectation of privacy in the information, and if this
expectation is one society recognizes as reasonable, then law
enforcement's viewing or obtaining that information from the
phone constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.2 °
If, however, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
the information, then there is no Fourth Amendment
search.2' Therefore, when considering the legality of a search
of a cellular phone's contents, it makes sense to consider (1)
whether a phone's owner has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the general contents of a cellular phone, and (2)
whether some information is the subject of a reasonable
expectation of privacy while other information is not.
Another important distinction must be addressed. Not
all information stored on a cellular phone is of the same ilk,
because some stored items are far more private than others.
Consider a very personal text message, or a private
photograph captured with a camera phone. These items are
naturally more private than less personal information, such
as a list of recently dialed telephone numbers or an address
book. The varying degrees of privacy expectations that attach
to these different types of information may lead to different
Fourth Amendment conclusions about the legality of a search.
Accordingly, this article distinguishes between two
different types of data that law enforcement seeks to obtain:
"coding information" and "content-based information."
Coding information describes information that merely
identifies the parties to a communication. This information
includes phone numbers, email addresses, pager numbers,
and any label that uniquely identifies an account. This
information is similar to the return or receiving address
printed on an envelope, which uniquely identifies a location.22
19. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("ITihere is a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'").
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 905 (9th Cir.
2008) (analogizing the number dialed in sending a text message to the address
printed on the envelope of a letter).
18720101
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It tells a third party where to deliver the letter, but it
does not reveal the handwriting inside. Content-based
information describes (1) the substance of a communication
and (2) a privately stored piece of information reserved for
personal use. This information includes text messages,
emails, voicemails, digital photographs, and other data.
The characterization of information as either coding or
content-based may bear on its level of Fourth Amendment
protection. If a type of information is not the subject of a
reasonable expectation of privacy, then the Fourth
Amendment does not protect it, because viewing it is not
considered a search. Further, even if coding and content-
based information are both subjects of a reasonable
expectation of privacy, this distinction may aid in developing
an appropriate standard by which searches incident to arrest
may be conducted. The next two sections of this article
consider this distinction, analyzing separately the
implications for both coding and content-based information.
II. CODING INFORMATION
Coding information describes data that reveals only the
identity of a party to a communication without disclosing the
subject matter of that communication. It consists of phone
numbers, email addresses, pager numbers, and other labeling
information that uniquely identifies an account. In the
context of cellular phones, coding information consists of
phone numbers that are usually contained in a list of recently
dialed or recently received calls or text messages. This
information tells its observer the identity of the other party to
a call or text message, but it does not reveal the content of
that call or message.
If a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
coding information contained in her cellular phone, then an
officer's examination of that data constitutes a search under
the Fourth Amendment.23 If, however, there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the coding information stored on the
phone, then examining that information does not constitute a
search, and a warrant (or warrant exception) is not required.
One then must determine whether an individual holds a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the coding information
23. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52.
[Vol:50
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stored on her cellular phone.24
Coding information is the same kind of information that
law enforcement regularly obtains without a warrant by
using pen registers and trap-and-trace devices. 2  A pen
register is a device that records the phone numbers
associated with outgoing calls from a particular phone.26 A
trap-and-trace device records the phone numbers of incoming
calls. 27 The Supreme Court has long held that police may use
these devices to record phone numbers.28 The Court has
reasoned that when a person shares this information with his
telephone company by sending or receiving a call, he does not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone number
at the other end of the call or text message.29
Although this article focuses upon the information that is
stored on a cellular phone rather than information that is
intercepted en route to its destination, the character of the
information is the same-a particular telephone number.
24. This article assumes in its discussion that the person in possession of a
cellular phone is its owner, and not a borrower or some other non-owner. While
at least one circuit court has stated that "mere possession of a cell phone gives
rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding its contents," United States
v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 577 (5th Cir. 2008), different questions arise from a
non-owner scenario. These questions are not considered here for reasons of
length and author interest.
25. Content-based information is different in kind from the information
recorded by pen registers and trap-and-trace devices, as these devices do not
record the substance of a communication. James Adams, Suppressing Evidence
Gained by Government Surveillance of Computers, 19 CRIM. JUST. MAG.,
Spring 2004, at 46, available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/cjmag/19-
1/surveillance.html.
26. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 n.1 (1979) (citing United States v.
N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977)).
27. United States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1995).
28. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46.
29. Id. ("We therefore conclude that petitioner in all probability entertained
no actual expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, and that, even
if he did, his expectation was not 'legitimate.' The installation and use of a pen
register, consequently, was not a 'search,' and no warrant was required.").
Congress authorized the use of pen registers and trap-and-trace devices in the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2006). It
later expanded the scope of information these devices can legally capture to
include information pertaining to Internet communications, such as email
addresses, in Section 216 of the USA Patriot Act of 2001. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-
3125 (2006). The Act importantly limits the use of pen registers and trap-and-
trace devices to capturing "dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling
information utilized in the processing and transmitting of wire or electronic
communications so as not to include the contents of any wire or electronic
communications." § 3121(c) (emphasis added).
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Therefore, one must ask why, if law enforcement can obtain
the information from a pen register or trap-and-trace device
without a warrant, the same should not hold for the identical
information stored on a cellular phone. The data exists in a
different location (stored on a phone versus en route to a
destination), but is the reasonable expectation of privacy in
the information on the phone not already lost when a call is
sent or received? After all, this information was shared with
the cellular service provider and exposed for interception by
pen registers and trap-and-trace devices.
Here, location is the key. When data has not been
intercepted, but could have been via a pen register, it is very
different than if the data actually had been intercepted.
Justice Scalia makes a similar argument in Kyllo v. United
States, where law enforcement used a thermal imaging device
to gather heat images of a suspect's home." In holding that a
Fourth Amendment search had occurred, Justice Scalia
explains: "The fact that equivalent information could
sometimes be obtained by other means does not make lawful
the use of means that violate the Fourth Amendment."3
A basic analogy may shed further light on this point.
Imagine that you send a letter to a friend. Nothing stops law
enforcement from observing the information on the outside of
the envelope while the letter is in the custody of the postal
service. However, if law enforcement does not obtain that
information while the letter is in transit, the opportunity is
lost. Once the letter reaches a person's mailbox, or at least
the inside of his home, it has entered a location in which an
owner has a reasonable expectation of privacy.2 Similarly,
once the information sent from a cellular phone is no longer
in transit, it is no longer obtainable by a pen register.33
30. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30 (2001).
31. Id. at 35 n.2 ("The police might, for example, learn how many people are
in a particular house by setting up year-round surveillance; but that does not
make breaking and entering to find out the same information lawful.").
Understandably, Kyllo dealt with privacy in relation to the home, but the
reasoning applies well to the difference between intercepting information via a
pen register as opposed to illegally obtaining information from the memory of a
cellular phone.
32. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 732 (1984) ("It is certainly true
that a homeowner has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his
home, including items owned by others.").
33. It is, however, potentially subject to a subpoena served upon the cellular
service provider. Cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 735-36 (relying on
[Vol:50
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Therefore, the incoming and outgoing phone numbers stored
in recent call lists are like the letter that has already been
delivered-they are now in a protected area. 4  A different
outcome would create a Fourth Amendment black hole for
any area where information exists after the fact, as long as
law enforcement could have previously viewed it.
Most courts seem to agree, at least implicitly, with this
analysis, as they have not often considered this distinction
between coding and content-based information. 5 Instead,
they have analyzed phones' contents as a whole. In so doing,
courts have regularly dismissed the suggestion that a person
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
general information (both coding and content-based) stored in
his cellular phone. For example, the government argued in
one case that searching a cellular phone's contents during an
investigative stop was akin to running a license check during
a traffic stop.3 6  In response to this argument, the Fifth
Circuit stated that "[u]nlike a driver's license and vehicle
registration, which are typically issued by a governmental
entity, cellular phones contain a wealth of private
information, including emails, text messages, call histories,
address books, and subscriber numbers. [The defendant] had
a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding this
information."37  In this same regard, courts have regularly
held that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the contents of his cellular phone. Thus, absent an
applicable exception, law enforcement must obtain a warrant
even if it only seeks to search a cellular phone for coding
information.
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (holding bank records
obtainable by subpoena because privacy expectation was lost when records were
conveyed to bank employees)); supra note 16 and accompanying text.
34. The outgoing call list is more appropriately analogized to a written log of
all addresses to whom one has sent letters. It is unique in that it is an internal
record, and thus different from information that is sent via a third party.
35. But see infra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing courts that
have noted such a distinction in substance, if not in name).
36. United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 577 (5th Cir. 2008).
37. Id. (citing United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 258-59 (5th Cir. 2007)).
38. See, e.g., Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 905 (9th
Cir. 2008); Finley, 477 F.3d at 258-59. In addition, the Ninth Circuit recently
held that government employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
text messages they send, even when the messages are stored on the service
provider's server. Quon, 529 F.3d at 910.
2010]
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Professor Orin Kerr has observed:
[C]ourts generally do not engage in creative normative
inquiries into privacy and technological change when
applying the Fourth Amendment to new technologies. For
better or for worse, courts have tended to apply the same
property-based principles to such cases that they have
applied elsewhere. This has focused attention on whether
government investigators collect information that
technology has hidden or information that technology has
exposed.39
This statement may shed light on the general agreement of
the courts that a cellular phone's owner holds a reasonable
expectation of privacy in its contents. A cellular phone is a
piece of physical property that must be manipulated before
the information stored within is exposed. In a way,
technology has "hidden" the information stored inside it,4"
such as photographs that would otherwise be printed on
photo paper or text messages that otherwise might be written
on paper. This property-based focus looks to protect cellular
phone users, at least initially, in determining that viewing
and seizing a cellular phone's contents is a search. This
article later explains, however, that classifying it as a search
under the Fourth Amendment has so far presented only a
minor hurdle to prosecutors in attempting to use evidence of a
cellular phone's contents at trial. Thus, a privacy-based view,
rather than a rudimentary property-based view, is necessary
to conform to Fourth Amendment standards in the cellular
phone context, even if courts would rather not engage in such
an inquiry.
As a matter of practicality, the coding/content-based
distinction may seem of little significance at first glance.
Regardless of one's characterization of the data, if the
information is stored on a cellular phone, then its owner has a
39. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 831
(2004).
40. In speaking of information that technology exposes, Professor Kerr
points to technology that law enforcement uses to obtain information in ways
that it previously could not. See id. at 828-30 (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207 (1986) (discussing aerial surveillance of land using airplane); United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (discussing chemical testing of
substance for presence of illegal narcotics); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
(1979) (examining use of pen register to obtain telephone numbers)).
192 [Vol:50
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reasonable expectation of privacy in it. But if courts continue
their regular practice of upholding warrantless searches of
cellular phones,4 this distinction will help place a limit on
what information the government can access. To this end,
when police search a suspect's cellular phone incident to his
arrest, the coding/content-based distinction provides a useful
line of demarcation (or a helpful starting point at least)
between what police may view and what they may not.
III. CONTENT-BASED INFORMATION
The Fourth Amendment should grant significant
protection to content-based information because, unlike
coding information, it consists of the subject matter of a
communication as well as privately stored data reserved for
one's personal use. As noted above, this category includes the
actual text message rather than the mere address of the
recipient or sender; it further includes private information
stored on a phone, such as digital photographs, videos, and
personal memos.
Pen registers and trap-and-trace devices do not record
content-based information, and therefore no analogy
regarding these devices needs consideration. But how
protected is content-based information as compared to coding
information? Should content-based information receive
greater protection than coding information? This brief
section examines judicial treatment of content-based
information, finding in the limited case law a general view
that an owner and possessor of content-based information has
a reasonable expectation of privacy in it.
Courts have found that content-based information
deserves more protection than coding information, without
using these specific terms. For example, the Ninth Circuit
held in Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co. that users of text
messaging services have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in their text messages stored on the service provider's
network." The court quoted Smith v. Maryland," stating
that "a pen register differs significantly from the listening
device employed in Katz, for pen registers do not acquire the
41. See infra Part IV.A-B.
42. Quon, 529 F.3d at 904.
43. Smith, 442 U.S. 735.
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contents of communications."" To the Ninth Circuit, the
contents of text messages were naturally more like the live
conversation in Katz than the telephone numbers in Smith.45
Thus, even when stored outside the user's pager and on a
third-party server, the contents of the messages were still
protected by the communicating party's reasonable
expectation of privacy.46 It follows that when text messages
are stored on an actual phone, there is little question that the
phone's owner has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
messages.47
Email, now accessible via modern devices like the iPhone
and G2 ("smart phones"), has received relatively little
treatment in the courts in terms of its content-based nature.48
Email, unlike text messages, is most regularly stored on
third-party servers. However, if a user sets up a Package on
Package account, then the email messages can be downloaded
onto the phone and stored there rather than on a remote
44. Quon, 529 F.3d at 904 (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 741).
45. See id. at 904-05.
46. Id. at 905-06; see also United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 577 (5th
Cir. 2008) (discussing whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of
privacy with regard to text messages stored on a phone); United States v.
Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 258-59 (5th Cir. 2007) (considering whether the defendant
had a property or possessory interest in a phone on which he sent text
messages).
47. If nothing else, just like with coding information, the location alone of
the text messages should dictate that a reasonable expectation of privacy
attaches. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
48. Before being vacated en banc for ripeness, a Sixth Circuit panel
determined that emails are protected as content-based. Warshak v. United
States, 490 F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated en banc, 532 F.3d 521 (6th
Cir. 2008). The Warshak court held that email users have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of their emails stored with an Internet
service provider ("ISP"). Id. Even though the user agreement with the ISP
granted the company the reserved right to access a user's emails, the court held
that the emails were protected because ISP employees do not regularly read
subscribers' emails. Id. at 474. Consistent with this view, the Ninth Circuit
has held that an email user does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the mere identifying information attached to an email (i.e., the subject heading
and address). United States v. Forrester, 495 F.3d 1041, 1048-49 (9th Cir.
2007). These holdings adhere to the coding/content-based distinction, at least
regarding information stored with a third party and not on a cellular phone. No
other circuit has addressed the issue, and few district courts have examined it
either. But see United States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 393-94 (E.D.N.Y.
2008) ("Courts have generally found a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
email messages themselves."); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417-18
(C.A.A.F. 1996).
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server. 9  When emails are stored on the phone, the same
analysis for text messages stored on a phone should apply to
email because of the nearly identical function of the two
media.
In addition, digital photographs are content-based
information for which an owner of a phone has a reasonable
expectation of privacy.50 This content is similar to all strains
of coding and content-based information that are stored
within cellular phones in that it exists in the actual phone,
concealed from view. Photographs and videos, however, are
potentially even more sensitive and private than other forms
of content-based information, for obvious reasons. It is
photographs and videos, among other content, that may
justify an argument limiting the scope of searches of cellular
phones incident to arrest. This issue is taken up in Part
IV.D.
Thus, users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
content-based information stored on their cellular phones.
The terrain does become less clear for content-based
information stored on third-party servers. In fact, for text
messages and emails stored on third-party servers, depending
on ISP user agreements and other factors, the existence of a
reasonable expectation of privacy is not without some doubt.
But for purposes of this section, it is enough to state that the
Fourth Amendment is implicated when officers search the
content-based information stored in a cellular phone.
Stepping back from the coding/content-based distinction,
one might view the issue as simply as the Supreme Court
stated in United States v. Ross: "[Tihe Fourth Amendment
provides protection to the owner of every container that
conceals its contents from plain view."51 While this statement
certainly pertains to the contents of a cellular phone,
49. Instant Message Interview with Julie W., MobileMe Customer Support
Representative, Apple, Inc. (Nov. 20, 2008) (on file with author). "Package
on Package" is a technology used in mobile phones and other devices
where high-density storage is required. See Richard Crisp, Package-on-Package
Is Killer App for Handsets, EE TIMES.COM, July 30, 2008,
http://www.eetimes.com/news/semi/rss/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=209900383
&cid=RSSfeed eetimessemiRSS.
50. Of course, information displayed on the face of the phone and easily
observable by others, like a wallpaper photograph on the home screen of a
phone, would not hold a subjective or objective expectation of privacy.
51. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982).
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discussing the coding/content-based distinction allows the
consideration of a number of interesting questions. Further,
Part IV.D of this article revisits this distinction in attempting
to determine whether and how to limit the scope of various
cellular phone searches to protect citizens' basic Fourth
Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure.
Before this attempt, however, more examination must be
given to the developing jurisprudence regarding the
warrantless search of cellular phones.
IV. JUDICIAL ANALYSES OF WARRANTLESS CELLULAR PHONE
SEARCHES
This section examines various circuit and district court
analyses of warrantless cellular phone searches. It highlights
a budding legal fiction in the application of the exigent
circumstances exception and an emerging ideological divide
in the application of the search incident to arrest exception.
Although to lawfully search a cellular phone's contents, law
enforcement must first lawfully seize the phone, this section
will not address the seizure issue because the fact that the
container is a phone adds little to the seizure analysis.
As discussed prior, when officers examine a cellular
phone's contents, a Fourth Amendment "search" occurs.52
The more difficult question arises, however, when officers fail
to obtain a warrant before engaging in such a search. Do
officers need a warrant to search the information stored on a
cellular phone? One would assume so, since the search
implicates Fourth Amendment protections. However, a
review of case law suggests the opposite. More often than
not, federal courts have validated warrantless searches of
cellular phones, usually relying on one of two exceptions
to the warrant requirement-exigent circumstances and
search incident to arrest.5 3  Courts applying the exigent
circumstances exception to allow warrantless searches of
cellular phones may be furthering a new legal fiction-that
an exigency exists merely because information is stored on a
cellular phone. In addition, there is a growing divide among
courts in their application of the search incident to arrest
exception such that, faced with the same facts, a handful of
52. See supra Parts II, III.
53. See infra Parts IV.A, B.
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courts would invalidate a warrantless search of a cellular
phone incident to arrest while many more would uphold it.
A. The Exigent Circumstances Exception
The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here there are
exigent circumstances in which police action literally must
be 'now or never' to preserve the evidence of the crime, it
is reasonable to permit action without prior judicial
evaluation."54 This statement is the essence of the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. It has
been applied to a broad scope of scenarios, including
warrantless home55 and automobile searches.56 Courts have
more recently applied this exception in the context of cellular
phone searches.
A case from the District of Kansas provides a good
example of the rationale federal courts have used in
upholding warrantless cellular phone searches based on
exigent circumstances. In United States v. Parada, officers
properly seized a defendant's cellular phone during the course
of an inventory search of a van. At the warehouse where
the inventory search took place, an officer searched the
contents of the cellular phone, looking at the phone numbers
in the list of recent calls and recording them." The
government argued that this search was justified, because
had the phone received additional calls, numbers in the
recent call list would have been lost.59 The court upheld the
search under the exigent circumstances exception.6 0  It
54. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 505 (1973).
55. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967). In Warden, the Supreme
Court held that officers' hot pursuit of a suspected criminal into a residence
created an exigency that alleviated the need for a warrant to enter and
subsequently search a home. Id.
56. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970). Exigent circumstances
justify the original rationale behind the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement because an automobile's inherent mobility creates the exigency
that evidence will be lost or removed from the jurisdiction and out of a warrant's
reach. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 591 (1991) (citing United States
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982)). Later cases have strayed from the notion
that an exigency is required to trigger the automobile exception, citing the
reduced privacy expectation regarding vehicles because of their "pervasive
regulation." California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985) (citation omitted).
57. United States v. Parada, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1303-04 (D. Kan. 2003).
58. Id. at 1297.
59. Id. at 1303.
60. Id. at 1303-04.
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reasoned:
Because a cell phone has a limited memory to store
numbers, the agent recorded the numbers in the event
that subsequent incoming calls effected the deletion or
overwriting of the earlier stored numbers. This can occur
whether the phone is turned on or off, so it is irrelevant
whether the defendant or the officers turned on the phone
. . . . [U]nder these circumstances, the agent had the
authority to immediately search or retrieve, as a matter of
exigency, the cell phone's memory of stored numbers of
incoming phone calls, in order to prevent the destruction
of this evidence.6
1
As another court stated when faced with similar facts, "[i]t
was the function and limitation of the cell-phone technology
which motivated the investigating agents to conduct an
immediate search of the phones, rather than seek a
warrant."
62
Other courts have agreed with this general line of
reasoning that an exigency exists when officers search a
cellular phone's contents. For example, the Northern District
of West Virginia upheld a warrantless search of defendants'
cellular phones that were seized during a search of their
63persons. The court examined the specific features of the
phone at issue, finding that the Motorola V3 "Razer" had an
automatic delete function by which an owner could set the
phone to purge all text messages every one to ninety-nine
days.64 According to the court, this feature created an
exigency that justified officers' warrantless searches of the
phones, because the text messages could have been lost as
evidence.65
Thus where one court found that the limitation of cellular
phone technology justified a warrantless search,66 another
cited a phone's advanced feature in upholding a similar
search." But whether a specific phone's technology is limited
61. Id.
62. United States v. Zamora, No. 1:05 CR 250 WSD, 2006 WL 418390, at *4
(N.D. Ga. Feb. 21, 2006).
63. United States v. Young, Criminal Action Nos. 5:05CR-63-01-02
(STAMP), 2006 WL 1302667, at *12-13 (N.D. W. Va. May 9, 2006).
64. Id. at *13.
65. Id.
66. See Zamora, 2006 WL 418390, at *4.
67. See Young, 2006 WL 1302667, at *13.
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or advanced may be irrelevant. First, cellular service
providers keep records of incoming and outgoing calls,68
eliminating any exigency regarding the potential loss of
phone numbers from the list of recent calls stored in a
cellular phone. Text messages, however, present a more
difficult issue, as cellular companies generally only store the
contents of text messages on private accounts for about two
weeks before deleting them.69 Still, if text messages are, in
fact, saved for roughly two weeks, then it leaves officers more
than adequate time to obtain a warrant and serve it upon the
cellular company. In the case of government or company-
issued phones, texts are often saved because of the legal
requirements pertaining to business or government-related
communications. 70  Further, some text messages can be
retrieved from a cellular phone's Subscriber Identity Module
(SIM) card even after the user has deleted them, as long as
new information has not been stored over the old message.7'
One then must question where the exigency exists. The
telephone numbers stored in a phone are certainly not lost,
and text messages are feasibly accessible for about two weeks
from the cellular provider and potentially for longer if they
still exist on the SIM card. Further, address books contain
68. A cellular phone user for the past nine years, the author has received a
statement every month listing all incoming and outgoing calls and text
messages. This experience has been consistent among three separate cellular
phone companies-Verizon, U.S. Cellular, and TMobile-during this time
period. Therefore, it seems safe to assume that cellular companies do, in fact,
retain records of incoming and outgoing calls and text messages. For an
example of a court operating under the same assumption, see United States v.
James, No. 1:06CR134 CDP, 2008 WL 1925032, at *7 n.3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 29,
2008) ("1I am not convinced by the government's evidence that even the call logs
are in danger of being destroyed by incoming calls. The service provider keeps
records of the incoming and outgoing calls .... .") (citation omitted).
69. See Mike Wendland, Mayor's Texts Weren't Private, but Yours Probably
Are, USA TODAY, Jan. 24, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-01-
24-detroit-textsN.htm. A spokesman for Sprint reportedly stated:
We do keep [text messages] for about two weeks .... But that's just to
make sure they get sent if the customer's phone is turned off or out of
the network. After that, even if not retrieved, they're gone. We don't




71. See Mobile Telephone Evidence, http://trewmte.blogspot.com/200611/
deleted-sms-text-messages.html (Nov. 4, 2006, 11:52 EST) (detailing the storage
and delete procedure for text messaging).
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static information that remains in the phone indefinitely. As
one district court observed in a footnote:
There is no evidence that a cell phone's address book
would be altered by incoming calls, and I am not
convinced by the government's evidence that even the call
logs are in danger of being destroyed by incoming calls.
The service provider keeps records of the incoming and
outgoing calls... and so the fact that they might not all
be stored on the phone itself does not mean they will be
lost forever. To the extent that the government has cited
cases holding otherwise, I disagree with the conclusions of
those courts.
72
Therefore, courts that allow the search of a cellular
phone's contents based on exigent circumstances may be
furthering a legal fiction-that an exigency exists merely
because the information that police seek is stored on a
cellular phone, regardless of whether there is a true risk of
losing the information. The simple fact that an item is a
cellular phone does not alone create a "now or never"
situation in which police must act immediately to preserve
evidence of a crime.73 Therefore, unless a warrant exception
other than the exigent circumstances doctrine applies, law
enforcement officers should generally obtain a warrant before
searching a cellular phone's contents.
B. The Search Incident to Arrest Exception
Courts have more commonly upheld warrantless searches
of cellular phones by means of the exception for searches
incident to arrest. The Supreme Court has justified this
warrant exception on the twin grounds of officer safety and
preventing the destruction of evidence. 74 Thus an officer, to
72. United States v. James, No. 1:06CR134 CDP, 2008 WL 1925032, at *7
n.3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 29, 2008) (citing United States v. Young, Criminal Action
Nos. 5:05CR63-01-02 (STAMP), 2006 WL 1302667, at *12-13 (N.D. W. Va. May
9, 2006); United States v. Zamora, No. 1:05 CR 250 WSD, 2006 WL 418390
(N.D. Ga. Feb. 21, 2006); United States v. Parada, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (D.
Kan. 2003)).
73. See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 505 (1973).
74. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). As Justice Stewart
explained for the Chimel majority:
[Ilt is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested
in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in
order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety
might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition,
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prevent an arrestee from reaching a weapon to harm the
officer or effectuate an escape, may search the person of the
arrestee as well as the immediately surrounding area,
commonly called the "grab area."" Likewise, an arresting
officer can search the arrestee and immediately surrounding
area for evidence that an arrestee could destroy or hide.76
Courts allowing warrantless cellular phone searches
based on the search incident to arrest exception have
generally reasoned that a cellular phone differs little from a
basic pager, address book, or cigarette box, all which may be
lawfully searched incident to a suspect's arrest.77 These
courts' conclusions may be further justified by the notion that
a phone may contain evidence that a technologically swift
suspect could easily delete with the stroke of a key.7"
However, a minority of courts have struck down the search of
a cellular phone incident to arrest, differing significantly in
reasoning from the courts that have validated such searches.
This subsection lays out both arguments, finding that the
minority reflects a more constitutionally sound position.
Before examining courts' application of search incident to
arrest doctrine to cellular phone searches, this discussion
must consider two earlier cases: United States v. Robinson
79
and United States v. Chadwick. ° These cases provide the
ideological fork in the road by which courts have diverged on
it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize
any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might
reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be
governed by a like rule.
Id.
75. See id.; United States v. Gandia, 424 F.3d 255, 261-62 (2d. Cir. 2005)
("Under Chimel, police may conduct a search of the arrestee's person and the
area within his immediate control-construing that phrase to mean the area
from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence, i.e., the 'grab area.'" (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).
One of the earliest courts to use the term "grab area" in an opinion was the
Court of Appeals of New York in People v. Clements, 339 N.E.2d 170, 178 (N.Y.
1975).
76. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
77. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
78. See Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56
UCLA L. REv. 27, 40 (2008) ("An arrestee familiar with the functions of his cell
phone could just as easily delete text messages or call logs as he could tear up a
letter or an incriminating list of addresses on a piece of paper.").
79. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218.
80. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
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this issue.
Robinson is famous for its holding that a defendant's
cigarette box, found on his person, could be searched incident
to his arrest."1  In Robinson, an officer arrested Willie
Robinson for driving after his license had been revoked.82 The
officer searched Robinson incident to the arrest and removed
a crumpled cigarette package from his coat pocket." The
officer then searched the contents of the cigarette package
and found capsules containing heroin.8s The Court held that
the search incident to Robinson's arrest lawfully extended to
the illegal contents of the cigarette package.85
Later, in Chadwick, the Court distinguished Robinson.
There, police had seized a double-locked foot locker from a
defendant's car and subsequently searched its contents at the
police station more than an hour later.86 The Court cited
Robinson in stating that, incident to an arrest, a search of
items "within the 'immediate control' area" of the arrestee is
generally reasonable.8 7 However, the Court distinguished
between items that are immediately associated with the
arrestee's person and other items, such as luggage:
Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or
other personal property not immediately associated with
the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and
there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain
access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy
evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident
of the arrest.88
In the reasoning of the Court, the foot locker was not
immediately associated with the arrestee's person, and thus
once police had exercised exclusive control over it and more
than an hour had passed, the search was no longer incident to
the arrest.8 9  Accordingly, the search was unreasonable
absent a warrant.90
81. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236.
82. Id. at 220.
83. Id. at 223.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 236.
86. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 4 (1977).
87. Id. at 15 (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. 218).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 15-16.
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Turning back to the cellular phone cases, courts have
applied Robinson and Chadwick differently in reaching
different outcomes. For instance, in United States v. Finley,
the Fifth Circuit validated a warrantless cellular phone
search incident to the defendant's arrest.91 There, officers
seized the defendant's cellular phone, which was found on his
person, incident to a drug arrest.92 Later, at another location,
the officers interviewed the defendant, at which time they
searched the phone's call records and text messages and
questioned him about them.93 A number of the text messages
related to narcotics dealings and were subsequently used in
the prosecution. 94 The court explained that a cellular phone,
unlike the foot locker in Chadwick, "does not fit into the
category of 'property not immediately associated with [his]
person."'95 Rather, the phone was more analogous to the
cigarette box found in Robinson's coat pocket. Therefore, the
court held that the search of the phone's contents did not
violate the Fourth Amendment, as it was a valid search
incident to arrest.96 A majority of courts facing similar facts
have agreed with Finley's conclusion. 97
The court in United States v. Park,8 however, viewed
things differently. In that case, officers did not seize or
search the defendants' cellular phones at the time of arrest or
soon thereafter.99  Rather, they first transported the
defendants to the police station for booking, where they then
seized the defendants' cellular phones and placed them into
envelopes. 00 Officers eventually searched the phones more
91. United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007).
92. Id. at 254.
93. Id. at 254-55.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 260 n.7 (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15
(1977)).
96. See id. at 260 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235
(1973)).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 278 F. App'x 242 (4th Cir. 2008);
United States v. Mercado-Nava, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (D. Kan. 2007); United
States v. Brookes, No. CRIM 2004-0154, 2005 WL 1940124 (D.V.I. June 16,
2005); United States v. Cote, No. 03CR271, 2005 WL 1323343 (N.D. Ill. May 26,
2005).
98. United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573 (N.D.
Cal. May 23, 2007).
99. Id. at *2.
100. Id.
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than ninety minutes after the arrests had occurred."' The
Park court held that the searches violated the defendants'
Fourth Amendment rights, and thus the evidence was
inadmissible. 12 The court noted that Finley could be
distinguished because there, the court found that the search
was "substantially contemporaneous" with arrest, whereas
the Park search occurred at the station house roughly an
hour and a half after the arrest. 03 However, it was not this
factual difference, but rather a more fundamental ideological
principle, upon which the court based its analysis.0 4 The
court stated:
More fundamentally, however, this Court finds, unlike the
Finley court, that for purposes of Fourth Amendment
analysis cellular phones should be considered "possessions
within an arrestee's immediate control" and not part of
"the person." This is so because modern cellular phones
have the capacity for storing immense amounts of private
information. Unlike pagers or address books, modern cell
phones record incoming and outgoing calls, and can also
contain address books, calendars, voice and text messages,
email, video and pictures. Individuals can store highly
personal information on their cell phones, and can record
their most private thoughts and conversations on their cell
phones through email and text, voice and instant
messages.'0 5
Thus the phones, in containing potentially vast amounts of
the most private information, were less comparable to
Robinson's cigarette box and more like Chadwick's locked foot
locker. 106 Under Chadwick, once police had reduced the
phones to their exclusive control and no exigency existed
regarding destruction of evidence, they should have obtained
101. Id. at *1.
102. Id. at *7.
103. Id. at *7-8 (citing United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 n.7 (5th
Cir. 2007)).
104. Some courts have distinguished or dismissed Park on the timing issue
where officers have searched a phone contemporaneously with arrest. See
United States v. Santillan, 571 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1103 n.5 (D. Ariz. 2008);
United States v. Valdez, No. 06-CR-336, 2008 WL 360548, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Feb.
8, 2008); United States v. Curry, Criminal No. 07-100-P-H, 2008 WL 219966, at
*9 (D. Me. Jan. 23, 2008). However, the Park court made clear that the timing
issue is not the foundation on which its difference with Finley rests. See Park,
2007 WL 1521573, at *8.
105. Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (internal footnotes omitted).
106. Id.
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a warrant to search the contents of the phones. 10 7
Thus there exists a budding divide. Most courts have
agreed with Finley's reasoning, interpreting Supreme Court
case law to support warrantless cellular phone searches
incident to arrest.1 08 These courts also find support in cases
involving the search of pagers. 0 9 Almost uniformly, courts
have allowed the warrantless search of a pager's contents,
and cases in the Finley camp often analogize pagers to
cellular phones in upholding warrantless searches of cellular
phones incident to arrest.110 However, the Park court refused
to accept such a shaky analogy, recognizing the vast
difference in the privacy interests at stake regarding cellular
phones as compared to pagers.1 After all, traditional pagers
contain only coding information, while cellular phones
contain potentially vast amounts of content-based
information. More basically, a small minority of courts to
date has refused to accept further erosion of the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement absent authoritative
guidance. 1 2 The Park court stated:
The Court recognizes that subsequent cases have
extended Chimel's reach beyond its original
rationales .... However, absent guidance to the contrary
from the Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court, this Court is
unwilling to further extend this doctrine to authorize the
warrantless search of the contents of a cellular phone-
and to effectively permit the warrantless search of a wide
range of electronic storage devices-as a "search incident
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 278 F. App'x 242 (4th Cir. 2008);
United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Mercado-
Nava, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (D. Kan. 2007); United States v. Brookes, No. CRIM
2004-0154, 2005 WL 1940124 (D.V.I. June 16, 2005); United States v. Cote, No.
03-CR-271, 2005 WL 1323343 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2005).
109. See, e.g., Finley, 477 F.3d at 260 (citing as analogous, United States v.
Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding search of pager incident to
arrest)); Santillan, 571 F. Supp. 2d at 1102 (citing as analogous, United States
v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 534-36 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (discussing search of a pager
incident to arrest valid); Ortiz, 84 F.3d at 984 (discussing whether the
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the pager's
memory)).
110. See supra note 109; Gershowitz, supra note 78, at 37.
111. Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *9.
112. See id.; United States v. Wall, No. 08-60016-CR, 2008 WL 5381412, at
*3-4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2008); United States v. James, No. 1:06CR134 CDP,
2008 WL 1925032, at *10 n.4 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 29, 2008); United States v. LaSalle,
Cr. No. 07-00032 SOM, 2007 WL 1390820, at *7 (D. Haw. May 9, 2007).
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to arrest."
113
It is this minority that has shown respect for basic Fourth
Amendment principles and deference to the warrant
requirement.
C. Scope and Timing Issues
One must also question whether traditional notions of
the lawful scope of a search incident to arrest even fit in the
cellular phone context. Recall that a search incident to arrest
lawfully extends to the arrestee's person and the immediately
surrounding area. But traditional cases like Robinson and
Chadwick, both addressing the scope of a search of physical
evidence, may be a poor fit for cellular devices. With cellular
phones, a different notion of scope is at play-virtual rather
than spatial. The vast amount of information that may be
stored digitally in a cellular phone far exceeds traditional
concepts of the physical evidence that an arrestee can reach.
This observation is magnified when one considers that many
cellular phones can access remote databases. The virtual
scope of a cellular phone's contents is thus very different from
the spatial scope of a defendant's "grab area." The
Robinson/Chadwick concept of scope concerns physical objects
(illegal drugs in both cases), whereas the virtual concept of
scope concerns digital information. This distinction may
113. Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *9. The court in United States v. Wall
similarly refused to extend the search incident to arrest exception to include
cellular phones:
The Court declines to adopt the reasoning of Finley and extend law to
provide an exception to the warrant requirement for searches of cell
phones. The search of the cell phone cannot be justified as a search
incident to lawful arrest .... [T]he justification for this exception to the
warrant requirement is the need for officer safety and to preserve
evidence .... The content of a text message on a cell phone presents no
danger of physical harm to the arresting officers or others. Further,
searching through information stored on a cell phone is analogous to a
search of a sealed letter, which requires a warrant.
Wall, 2008 WL 5381412, at *3. The court in United States v. James agreed in
dicta:
I do not adopt [the Magistrate Judge's] conclusion that the search of
the cell phone was also justified as a search incident to arrest. I
recognize that the majority of cases considering this issue have
concluded . . . that similar warrantless searches are proper . . . . I
believe, however, that the analysis in United States v. Park and United
States v. LaSalle is more consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
James, 2008 WL 1925032, at *10 n.4 (citations omitted).
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indicate a difference in the motivation for these two different
types of searches: whereas officers may be looking for
contraband in a search for physical objects, they may be
conducting evidentiary searches when accessing the digital
information stored on a cellular phone. While the former is
lawfully rooted in the prevention of evidence destruction, the
latter is little more than a shortcut avoiding the longer route
of obtaining a warrant for information not at risk of being
destroyed. Where scope is virtual rather than spatial, the
sheer volume of digital information available within what
was traditionally considered a limited "grab area" raises new
privacy concerns and requires a new articulation of the
proper scope of a cellular phone's search incident to arrest.
Further, the Supreme Court's 2009 holding in Arizona v.
Gant.. raised a timing issue for searches incident to arrest
that could have widespread impact on searches of all
containers, including cellular phones. In that case, Gant was
arrested for driving while his license was suspended and
subsequently handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol
car.115 While he was locked in the back of the patrol car,
police searched his vehicle and found cocaine in a jacket on
the back seat." 6 The Court, with Justice Stevens writing the
opinion, held that the search was invalid because "the Chimel
rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a
recent occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured
and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment
at the time of the search."117 This holding limited a common
and broad reading of the rule of New York v. Belton, which
held that officers, incident to a lawful arrest of a car's recent
occupant, can search the entire passenger compartment of
that car (and any containers inside) without a warrant.11
While the Gant Court does not discuss it much further,
its holding focuses upon the proper point in time at which the
114. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
115. Id. at 1714.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1719. The Court also held "that circumstances unique to the
vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is 'reasonable
to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the
vehicle.'" Id. (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (Scalia, J.,
concurring)). For purposes of this commentary on timing, this holding is not
relevant.
118. Id. at 1717 (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981)).
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scope of a search (at least of a car) incident to arrest should
be measured." 9 By holding that the search incident to arrest
was improper since the arrestee was secured and not within
reaching distance of the car, the Court measured whether the
scope of the search was proper at the time of the search rather
than at the time of the arrest.2 ° Further, it is difficult to see
why measuring a search's scope based on the time of search
rather than the time of arrest should be limited to a scenario
involving the search of an automobile incident to arrest.
Should it not apply to a case like United States v. Brown,
where a pouch had been moved beyond the secured arrestee's
reach before it was searched?' 2' In Brown, the D.C. Circuit
upheld the search as a search incident to arrest, citing Belton
and stating that a search incident to arrest is valid as long as
it is limited to "containers in hand or within reach when the
arrest occurs."22 But if courts going forward apply Gant's
timing analysis generally to other searches incident to arrest,
then an officer seizing an arrestee's cellular phone would not
be able to search the phone's contents once the arrestee is
secured and out of reach of the phone. In addition, many
lower courts have explicitly applied Belton to non-automobile
contexts.' 2 ' It follows, then, that even if courts do not apply
Gant's timing holding broadly to all searches incident to
arrest, courts explicitly applying Belton to non-automobile
contexts should follow Gant's rule in these same non-
automobile contexts.
The Gant holding could be viewed as a straight
application of Chadwick. A car is "personal property not
immediately associated with the person," and thus once there
is no longer a threat that a weapon could be seized from it or
evidence inside it destroyed, "a search of that property is no
longer an incident of the arrest."'24 Gant does not look to
upset searches of items "immediately associated with the
person," like the cigarette box in Robinson, because these
119. See id. at 1719.
120. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009) (emphasis added).
121. See United States v. Brown, 671 F.2d 585, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per
curium).
122. See id. at 587.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Tavolacci, 704 F. Supp. 246, 252-53 (D.D.C.
1988) (citing cases applying Belton to non-automotive factual scenarios).
124. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977).
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items are easily distinguished from cars.'25 In the end then,
the Robinson/Chadwick distinction regarding whether a
cellular phone is an item "immediately associated with the
[arrestee's] person" or "personal property not immediately
associated with the [arrestee's] person" could become even
more pivotal if courts apply Gant outside the automobile
context.126 In the former scenario, Gant would not apply; in
the latter, Gant would limit the search of a cellular phone
incident to arrest to a situation where the arrestee is
unsecured and still within reach of the phone.
D. A New Standard for Searching Cellular Phones Incident to
Arrest
Although cellular phones potentially contain large
amounts of private information, it is not clear that their
search incident to arrest should be precluded altogether. The
above analysis demonstrates that searches of cellular phones
under the guise of exigent circumstances should generally not
be allowed, at least as the exigency allegedly pertains to the
loss of numbers from a recent call list or the loss of text
messages.127 Still, the wholesale prohibition of cellular phone
searches incident to arrest could be too limiting.
One reason for allowing the continued search of cellular
phones incident to arrest may be that some of the
information, such as an address book and photographs, is the
same kind of information that is often stored in a purse or a
wallet. Why should officers be precluded from obtaining this
information from a cellular phone but allowed to retrieve it
from a wallet? One answer may be that the very fact that the
information exists on a cellular phone, along with megabytes
upon megabytes of pictures or other private information,
places this "container" in its own category and precludes the
obtaining of any information from it absent a warrant. This
seems to be where the Park court's analysis leads, and it is
the standard advocated by one recent commentator. 28
125. See generally Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710.
126. Of course, courts could easily confine Gant to the automobile context if
they desire, at least until the Supreme Court (if ever) more explicitly states that
it applies to all search incident to arrest scenarios.
127. See supra Part IV.A.
128. See Bryan A. Stillwagon, Note, Bringing an End to Warrantless Cell
Phone Searches, 42 GA. L. REV. 1165, 1201 (2008) ("[T]he first step in solving
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Conversely, Professor Gershowitz argues that "it .. .makes
sense to allow police to review electronic call histories and
text messages" because they could be easily deleted by an
arrestee, just as papers in a wallet can be quickly
destroyed.'29 While this argument is logical, it is tempered by
two observations: (1) if officers have truly reduced a phone to
their exclusive possession and there is no longer an exigency,
then an arrestee could not feasibly destroy the information; 3 '
and (2) even if deleted from a phone, call histories and text
messages are likely available from the cellular provider, and
thus their "destruction" would not eliminate law
enforcement's ability to obtain the information.'3 '
Another possibility lies in allowing the search of only a
phone's coding information incident to arrest. This approach
has the attractiveness of continuing the bright-line rule
approach to search incident to arrest doctrine, but some
might see it as still too limiting for law enforcement. It would
allow officers to view recent call lists and text message
addressees, but not the content of text messages, photos, or
address books. With this rule, there would be less risk of law
enforcement viewing the information for which there is
a heightened expectation of privacy. Content-based
information stored in mass quantity-and its highly private
nature-is what puts cellular phones in a separate class from
other containers. Prohibiting the viewing of a phone's
content-based information while allowing officers to view its
coding information could allow law enforcement to obtain
information it frequently desires (e.g., call lists) while
granting citizens a safeguard against free reign over their
more personal information. Some courts have approved of
this brand of distinction, allowing coding information to be
admitted while suppressing content-based information.
32
the problem of warrantless cell phone searches is for the judiciary to recognize
that cell phones are, in fact, much more analogous to modern computers than to
wallets, briefcases, or even pagers, and thus 'police should obtain a search
warrant, just as they would when they seize a personal computer from an
accused.'" (quoting State v. Smith, No. 07-CA-47, 2008 WL 2861693, at *10
(Ohio Ct. App. July 25, 2008) (Donovan, J., dissenting))).
129. See Gershowitz, supra note 78, at 40.
130. See Gant discussion, supra notes 114-26 and accompanying text.
131. See supra Part IV.A.
132. As one court stated:
Moreover, we note that the trial court permitted only evidence
pertaining to the cell phone's call record and numbers matching those
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Still another option lies in allowing a search incident to
arrest of all the information stored on a phone, while
disallowing a search that accesses information stored on
remote databases. This would allow officers to search a
phone's text messages, call records, address book, and
photographs, 133 while forbidding them from listening to
voicemails (or viewing emails, for phones with this
capability), which are generally stored on remote servers.
This is one approach offered by Professor Gershowitz, and it
does improve upon the current jurisprudential general trend
that would seemingly allow the search of all of a phone's
contents in addition to remotely accessed data.134  However,
this approach leaves too much private information
unprotected from a search incident to arrest. If courts
adopted this rule, it would subject anyone who is the subject
of a custodial arrest, even for a traffic violation, to a pre-
approved foray into a virtual warehouse of their most
intimate communications and photographs without probable
cause.
A prohibition on searching cellular phones incident to
arrest, as the Park court essentially ruled, is a feasible
reading of Supreme Court precedent and respects basic
Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable
searches. 135 In addition, as discussed above, application of the
supplied by the informant .... It granted, however, [the defendant's]
motion to suppress incriminating photos also retrieved by the officers
from the phone. In doing so, the court appropriately admitted only that
evidence which the officers had a reasonable suspicion was on [the
defendant's] person at the time of his arrest. Thus, the broader privacy
concerns addressed in Park were not implicated here.
State v. Smith, No. 07-CA-47, 2008 WL 2861693, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. July 25,
2008). The court in United States v. Valdez also approved of a search that only
obtained a cellular phone's coding information, noting that the concerns in Park
were not implicated when an officer limited his search to a cellular phone's
address book and call history. United States v. Valdez, No. 06-CR-336, 2008
WL 360548, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 8, 2008).
133. At least one court has upheld the search of a camera incident to arrest,
which would support this view in terms of the photographs viewed while
searching a cellular phone. See United States v. Ayalew, 563 F. Supp. 2d 409,
416 (N.D.N.Y. 2008).
134. See Gershowitz, supra note 78, at 56. Gershowitz observes that courts
"almost certainly will . . . apply the search incident to arrest doctrine to the
iPhone," potentially allowing officers to view an iPhone's photos, movies,
recently viewed websites, emails, and a host of other information. Id. at 44.
135. See United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *9
(N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007).
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Gant holding to this context would buttress the Park
rationale, disallowing such searches if the arrestee were
secured and out of reach of the cellular phone. However,
courts are unlikely to follow the lead of Park and the
minority, 136 at least if they distinguish Gant as inapplicable
outside the automobile context. In light of this reality, the
coding/content-based distinction is a reasonable compromise
and a workable option. It is a clear, relatively bright-line
rule, which courts prefer in the search incident to arrest
context. 137 It protects citizens' Fourth Amendment privacy
rights while still giving law enforcement much of what it
already seeks (i.e., call and text message coding information).
This approach does limit police from immediately obtaining a
significant amount of information, but there is a minimal risk
of losing this content-based data, and it can be acquired
with a warrant. The coding/content-based distinction also
establishes a reasonable limiting line regarding the virtual
scope of a search of digital information incident to arrest.
Where traditional notions of physical scope are a poor fit for
digital information, this distinction provides a virtual "grab
area" within which law enforcement could legally operate.
Distinguishing between coding and content-based data
may be a more appropriate solution than an all-out ban on
searching cellular phones incident to arrest because
the custodial arrest context does justify a "reasonable
intrusion" into an arrestee's belongings. 13 Admittedly, such a
distinction could prove a bit messy, as officers may, at times,
inadvertently view content-based information while searching
only for coding information. Further, this type of scenario
might lead to difficult fact-finding in suppression hearings;
but fact-finding in suppression hearings is often difficult, and
this difficulty alone should not be enough to discard a
workable rule. There must be a line at which an intrusion
becomes unreasonable despite a custodial arrest. Protecting
a phone's practical library of private communications and
136. See Gershowitz, supra note 78, at 39, 40.
137. Id. at 34 (noting the "Court's affinity for bright-line rules").
138. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) ("A custodial
arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the
Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest
requires no additional justification .... It is the fact of the lawful arrest which
establishes the authority to search.").
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photographs from limitless viewing is an appropriate line.
The coding/content-based distinction establishes this line, and
it is a standard that courts and legislators should implement.
V. "SMART PHONES"
Technology and the Fourth Amendment continue to
grapple as advances in technology persist. Recently, cellular
phones have morphed into something far more complex. In
turn, new Fourth Amendment questions accompany the
advent of such devices as the iPhone, G2, and multiple
varieties of the Blackberry, as what were once phones are
now instruments comparable to computers. 139
Like computers, smart phones allow a user to access the
Internet, share photographs, view movies, and use email,
among other functions. 140 Some smart phones add to this list
the ability to record and replay live video,14 ' a capability that
many computers lack. While they still serve as phones,
telephonic capability alone no longer limits an electronic
device's identity to that of a phone alone. After all, some
people now use their personal computers and laptops
instead of phones, communicating orally through services
like Skype.' Difficulty lies in defining what exactly
distinguishes a smart phone from an older generation phone.
No agreement looks to exist regarding what exactly qualifies
as a so-called smart phone, and what does not. 43 It could be
built-in email capability that sets a device apart as a smart
phone, or the running of a full operating system, or maybe a
touch screen or a full keyboard. It is safe to say, however,
that the more a cellular device operates like a full-fledged
computer, the "smarter" it is. This section later revisits the
question, seeking a workable definition of "smart phone" that
139. As one court has observed, "[a] cell phone is similar to a personal
computer that is carried on one's person." United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d
562, 577 (5th Cir. 2008).
140. See Nichole Lee, T-Mobile G1 vs. Apple iPhone 3G, CNET.CoM, Sept. 23,
2008, http://news.cnet.com/t-mobile-gl-vs-apple-iphone-3g/.
141. David Pogue, A Blackberry with No Keyboard?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27,
2008, at B1.
142. See Roy Furchgott, Phones for That Other System, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26,
2006, at Cll (discussing VoIP industry leaders Skype and Vonage).
143. For a sampling of a variety of smart phones and an example of the lack
of popular agreement on how to define the term, see Smart Phone, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smartphone (last visited June 6, 2008).
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can be quickly and easily determined.
The reality that these newer devices function more like
computers than simple phones raises questions. Should they
be treated like any other cellular phone that is searched
incident to arrest? Or are these devices of such a unique and
complex character that they have moved beyond what may
reasonably be considered a cellular phone? Might the
potential for storing seemingly endless amounts of the most
private information place these instruments in a different
category of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence?
A. Searching Computers Incident to Arrest
The capabilities of these new cellular devices create
concerns beyond whether law enforcement is able to view call
lists, address books, and even text messages. As the Park
court stated in excluding evidence obtained from a cellular
phone incident to arrest:
Any contrary holding could have far-ranging consequences
.... [Tihe government asserted that, although the officers
here limited their searches to the phones' address books,
the officers could have searched any information-such as
emails or messages-stored in the cell phones. In
addition, in recognition of the fact that the line between
cell phones and personal computers has grown
increasingly blurry, the government also asserted that
officers could lawfully seize and search an arrestee's
laptop computer as a warrantless search incident to
arrest. As other courts have observed, "the information
contained in a laptop and in electronic storage devices
renders a search of their contents substantially more
intrusive than a search of the contents of a lunchbox or
other tangible object. A laptop and its storage devices
have the potential to contain vast amounts of information.
People keep all types of personal information on
computers, including diaries, personal letters, medical
information, photos and financial records."'"
One then must analyze not only whether traditional cellular
phones are searchable incident to arrest, as discussed prior,
but also whether laptops or personal computers are
144. United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (N.D.
Cal. May 23, 2007) (quoting United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1004
(C.D. Cal. 2006)).
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searchable incident to arrest.145  This subsection focuses
solely on the search incident to arrest exception as applied to
the search of computers, and not on the exigent
circumstances exception, because smart phones' computer-
like characteristics do not change the exigent circumstances
discussion from Part IV.A of this article. The same exigent
circumstances analysis for older generation phones applies to
smart phones: cellular service providers keep records of the
information at risk of being lost, and thus no real exigency
exists. Smart phones' comparability to computers, however,
bears upon whether they are searchable incident to arrest-if
smart phones and computers are synonymous, then the same
rule should apply to both.
A search of case law turns up a paucity of precedent
regarding the search of laptops or other computers incident to
arrest. It is unclear why there are so few cases involving
searches of computers incident to arrest. Computers have
been around for decades now, and laptops for many years as
well. Yet no federal cases and only one state case have
assessed the validity of a computer search incident to
arrest. 46 The answer may be that even police do not believe a
search of a computer incident to arrest is permissible, seeking
instead a warrant for the search of computers. One may look
to the plethora of case law discussing the search of computers
pursuant to warrants in support of this answer. 147 Granted,
145. This section considers only the search incident to arrest exception to the
warrant requirement. It is the most common exception applied to warrantless
cellular phone searches, and the most problematic considering it requires no
articulable suspicion at all, much less probable cause.
146. A December 15, 2008 author search of Westlaw's database of all state
and federal cases revealed State v. Washington, No. 47773-1-I, 2002 WL 104492
(Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2002), as the only relevant case applying this warrant
exception to the search of a computer.
147. See, e.g., United States v. Cartier, 543 F.3d 442 (8th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Henderson, 536 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Giberson,
527 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir.
2008); United States v. King, 509 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Rayburn House Office Bldg., Room 2113, 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007); United
States v. Flanders, 468 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 2006); Armstrong v. City of
Melvindale, 432 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 83
(2d Cir. 2005); Bellville v. Town of Northboro, 375 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2004);
United States v. Zimmerman, 277 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2002); Trulock v. Freeh, 275
F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2001).
Further highlighting law enforcement's focus on obtaining warrants to
search computers, many jurisdictions give explicit instructions on how to
effectively articulate the description in a warrant when seeking to obtain
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computers are often located in homes and the subject of an
investigation, leading to more necessity and incentive for
police to obtain a warrant. However, it is not uncommon for
people to carry laptops wherever they go, whether in the car,
on a train, at the airport, or at a coffee shop. Considering the
commonality of laptops, what else explains the utter lack of
cases applying search incident to arrest doctrine but law
enforcement's general assumption that a warrant is needed to
search an individual's computer? Courts have also applied
other warrant exceptions to computer searches, although
these instances are still few in number.14 8 Therefore, one can
start at a minimum with the assumption that the warrantless
search of a computer incident to arrest is legally
unprecedented and thus questionable at best.
The Court of Appeals of Washington is the only court
that has addressed the legality of a search of a computer
incident to arrest. In State v. Washington, police arrested the
defendant on suspicion of auto theft.149 Incident to the arrest,
an officer observed a black bag on the floor of the car.'50 The
officer unzipped the bag and discovered a laptop inside, which
the defendant stated he had bought for fifty dollars.15 ' The
officer brought the laptop to the station on the suspicion that
it was stolen, and another officer searched it to determine the
identity of its lawful owner.152 The court held that the arrest
was based upon probable cause and that the search of the bag
was "proper as a search incident to arrest.'' However,
although the police had probable cause to seize the laptop, the
"subsequent search of the computer's files . . . did not fall
under any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement."154
Therefore, the court held that the evidence obtained from the
laptop should have been suppressed. 155 Thus, since it applied
information from a computer. See Stillwagon, supra note 128, at 1184.
148. See Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Validity of Search or Seizure of
Computer, Computer Disk, or Computer Peripheral Equipment, 84 A.L.R. 5TH 1
(2008).
149. State v. Washington, No. 47773-1-I, 2002 WL 104492, at *1 (Wash. Ct.




153. Id. at *3.
154. Id.
155. State v. Washington, 2002 WL 104492, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 28,
2002).
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the search incident to arrest exception to the search of the
bag but held that no warrant exception applied to the laptop's
search, the court made it clear that the laptop could not be
searched incident to the defendant's arrest.
156
Other cases have discussed in dicta the legality of a
computer search incident to arrest. The Park court expressed
worry that allowing the search of a cellular phone incident to
arrest would lead to the search of laptops incident to arrest. 1
57
It chose not to begin the journey down that road of Fourth
Amendment erosion. Further, in United States v. Urbina,
Magistrate Judge Goodstein of the Eastern District of
Wisconsin, while recommending upholding the search of a
cellular phone incident to arrest, alluded that the search of a
computer incident to arrest would be invalid:
[T]he court acknowledges the observations by the court in
Park that the line between a cell phone and a personal
computer is becoming increasingly blurred. Many cell
phones are capable of browsing the internet or sending
and receiving email just like a personal computer.
Certainly, there may be many instances where the text of
emails sent and received, or a list of the websites a person
visited, may be of interest to law enforcement. However,
whether or not law enforcement may be permitted to
access these records by virtue of the fact that an arrestee
happened to have his cell phone on his person at the time
he was arrested is a question not presented in this case.
In the case before this court, it is clear that [the detective]
limited his search to the phone's address book and call
history. If the evidence in a future case were to show that
the warrantless search conducted by law enforcement was
essentially equivalent to a search of a personal computer,
without sufficient exigencies to justify such a search, the
court's reaction may be different, because of the
substantial invasion of privacy.'58
156. See id. at *2-3. The facts of the case do not disclose the length of time
between the seizure of the laptop and its search at the station house. The court,
in not discussing it, does not seem to concern itself with this detail. One might
determine that the court never considered the search incident to arrest
exception in relation to the laptop because it so clearly did not apply in the mind
of the court.
157. United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (N.D.
Cal. May 23, 2007).
158. United States v. Urbina, No. 06-CR-336, 2007 WL 4895782, at *14 (E.D.
Wis. Nov. 6, 2007) (emphasis added).
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Thus the court not only implied that it would invalidate the
search of a computer incident to arrest, but it also found the
fact that the officer limited the search of the phone to its
address book and call history worth noting.
Another source of guidance lies in a case that applied the
border exception to the warrant requirement-an exception
that is distinctly different from the search incident to arrest
exception. As the Supreme Court has stated, "the expectation
of privacy is less at the border than it is in the interior."1 59 At
the nation's border, law enforcement may search people and
their belongings freely without any suspicion.160 Only where
searches are highly intrusive, such as body cavity searches, is
reasonable suspicion required.'16  Yet even in this context of
such a limited expectation of privacy, in United States v.
Arnold, Judge Dean Pregerson of the Central District of
California raised concerns similar to those that the Park and
Urbina courts expressed. 62 Although subsequently reversed
by the Ninth Circuit, the district court invalidated the
suspicionless search of an individual's laptop computer, which
was removed from the defendant's luggage in the customs
area of Los Angeles International Airport. 63  The court
explained that "opening and viewing confidential computer
files implicates dignity and privacy interests. Indeed, some
may value the sanctity of private thoughts memorialized on a
data storage device above physical privacy."1 6 4 At least one
circuit court has also indicated that the search of a laptop at
the border may not be "routine," thus requiring reasonable
suspicion. 65  These instances, though limited to the border
search context, are meaningful in that they support a general
159. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154 (2004).
160. Id. at 152.
161. See United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir. 2006); United
States v. Lawson, 461 F.3d 697, 700 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Braks, 842
F.2d 509, 511-13 (1st Cir. 1988).
162. United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1003-04 (C.D. Cal. 2006),
rev'd, 523 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008).
163. Id. at 1000.
164. Id. at 1003 (citing United States v. Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d 709, 716
(9th Cir. 2002) (noting that "government intrusions into the mind" deserve
equal protection as do physical intrusions), abrogated by United States v.
Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004)).
165. See United States v. Roberts, 274 F.3d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 2001)
(upholding a laptop search because it was based upon reasonable suspicion
while assuming it was not "routine" in the border context).
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notion that information stored on a computer is highly
private, more so than most other information. For courts to
suggest that computers may have a level of heightened
privacy at the border, where Fourth Amendment protections
are at their lowest level, speaks to the inherent level of
privacy that attaches to computers.
Taken together, the lack of any meaningful case law
applying search incident to arrest doctrine to computer
searches, paired with the plethora of cases analyzing the
legality of computer searches pursuant to warrants, indicate
a general assumption that computers should not be subject to
warrantless and suspicionless searches incident to arrest.
This notion is buttressed by decisions such as Washington,
Park, Urbina, and, presumably, United States v. James,166
which would exclude evidence obtained from the search of a
computer incident to arrest. 167 Finally, the suggestion of one
court that a heightened level of privacy attaches to computers
during border searches only strengthens the argument that
computers should not be searched incident to arrest. The
capacity for storing immense amounts of intimately private
information simply places computers in a different category
than other "containers."
B. A Different Standard for Computers and Their New
Equivalents
If it is true that laptops and other computers are not
searchable incident to arrest, then it necessarily follows that
neither are smart phones (or at least they should not be).
These devices are laptops' new equivalents. As Professor
Gershowitz has suggested, courts should not apply "an ill-
fitting bright-line rule" to the iPhone and its peers. 16 Unlike
searches conducted with technology held by police, such as
thermal imaging devices and helicopters, searches of smart
phones-which are owned by private citizens en masse-have
the potential to subject millions of people to rummages
through their most private information without a hint of
suspicion."' Thus, if the warrantless search of a smart phone
166. United States v. James, No. 1:06CR134 CDP, 2008 WL 1925032, at *10
n.4 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 29, 2008).
167. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
168. Gershowitz, supra note 78, at 46.
169. See id. at 48. I do not wish to suggest that law enforcement officers
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incident to arrest is a Fourth Amendment violation, then
these searches have the potential to violate the Constitution
on a mass scale.
Further, searching smart phones incident to arrest could
be considered an end-run around the Fourth Amendment. If
smart phones are in fact equivalent to computers, which
police likely need a warrant to search, then searching smart
phones incident to arrest is a shortcut to obtaining the
desired data. But while it is less efficient to obtain a warrant,
efficiency does not justify Fourth Amendment violations. 7 °
Arguing that smart phones are more like older generation
cellular phones than computers would be disingenuous in this
light.
Gershowitz has suggested the following solutions to the
problem of smart phones: (1) limiting searches incident to
arrest to the crime related to the arrest,171 (2) encouraging
state legislatures to enact more protective laws, 72 (3) limiting
searches of these devices to the applications that are open
when the device is seized, 173 (4) limiting searches of these
devices to "five steps" of searching, 174 and (5) distinguishing
between data stored on the device and remote data accessible
generally wish to violate privacy rights or aimlessly sift through the private
information of citizens. However, unchecked authority in any forum naturally
leads to abuses.
170. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 n.2 (2001).
171. Gershowitz, supra note 78, at 49; see also Thornton v. United States,
541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring). This limitation was officially
adopted by the Court in Gant, at least in the context of vehicle searches incident
to arrest. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009) ("[C]ircumstances
unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it
is 'reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found
in the vehicle.'" (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004)
(Scalia, J., concurring))).
172. Gershowitz, supra note 78, at 50-53.
173. Id. at 53-54.
174. Id. at 54-56. Here, Gershowitz suggests a "'five-level deep' rule (or
some other admittedly arbitrary number) limiting the search of iPhones to a
total of five steps." Id. at 55. An example of this rule's operation in the context
of an iPhone would allow an officer to:
(1) turn on the phone; (2) open the internet browser; (3) type in a web-
based email account such as www.hotmail.com; (4) log into the account
(if the user id and password are saved); and (5) open a folder of
messages. If the officer completes the fifth step without finding
anything incriminating that could be destroyed, the officer would need
to stop searching. To search further, the officer would need to procure a
warrant.
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via the device.175 Gershowitz rightly notes that "despite the
flaws associated with each proposal, all are likely preferable
to doing nothing and allowing police to search thousands of
pages of electronic data without probable cause or a
warrant."17 6 But he does not advocate altogether eliminating
searches of iPhones and their progeny incident to arrest.
177
While these suggestions are creative and practical to
varying degrees, each one falls short of appropriate Fourth
Amendment protection if iPhones and their counterparts are
truly akin to computers. 7 8  Whatever rule applies to
computers should certainly apply to new generation cellular
devices, and a suspicionless search incident to arrest does not
pass muster.
Therefore, a different rule should apply to smart phones
as opposed to older generation cellular phones, and it should
mirror the rule that applies to the search of a computer
incident to arrest: a warrant is required. 79 A lesser standard
175. Id. at 56-57.
176. Id.
177. As Gershowitz states:
Much as the traditional search incident to arrest cases permit police to
open a wallet, take out a letter, and read it before the arrestee has an
opportunity to destroy the evidence, it also makes sense to allow the
police to review electronic call histories and text messages in a cell
phone.
Id. at 40.
178. After all, courts have even invalidated the search of computers pursuant
to warrants when officers have gone beyond a warrant's scope. See, e.g., United
States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275-76 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussing a holding
officer who violated Fourth Amendment when he viewed numerous computer
files pursuant to warrant without using the computer's search function to limit
the scope of what he viewed). The Carey court recognized that "[r]elying on
analogies to closed containers or file cabinets may lead courts to 'oversimplify a
complex area of Fourth Amendment doctrines and ignore the realities of
massive modern computer storage.'" Id. at 1275 (quoting Raphael Winick,
Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
75, 104 (1994)).
179. Some may argue that warrant exceptions based on probable cause, such
as the automobile exception, should apply as well. I do not agree with this
proposition because of the heightened privacy that attaches to a computer as
opposed to other containers. But see United States v. Johnson, 495 F.3d 536,
543 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding probable cause search of a computer valid under the
inevitable discovery exception).
For an example of appropriate police conduct regarding the search of an
iPhone, see United States v. Lemke, Criminal No. 08-216(1) (DWF/RLE), 2008
WL 4999246, at *7 (D. Minn. Nov. 19, 2008). There, police seized the
defendant's iPhone pursuant to his arrest. Id. They then prepared an affidavit
and secured a warrant before searching the contents of the phone for illegal
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would allow the search incident to arrest exception to
smother much of the protection the Fourth Amendment
guarantees regarding private information stored on these
devices. Further justifying a different rule for smart phones,
the coding/content-based standard proposed for older
generation phones in Part IV of this article would not work
for these newer devices. Take, for instance, the iPhone. On
that device, one can leave the photo function open when
turning the phone off, so that when it is later turned on, that
function is the first image that appears. This feature would
make content-based information (photographs) immediately
observable once the iPhone is powered on, requiring officers
later to explain why they observed otherwise off-limits
information in plain view. Such a scenario would lead to
difficult fact-finding in suppression decisions, straying far
from the Court's preferred bright-line search incident to
arrest jurisprudence.'1 0
Considering that two different rules are proposed in this
article-one for older generation cellular phones and one for
smart phones-an easily ascertainable line of distinction
must be made if the rules are to work. While other lines of
demarcation certainly exist, considering the technology as it
stands today, the most workable distinction may be phones
that have either a touch screen or a full keyboard. Older
generation cellular phones, as defined here, do not have
either of these two advanced features, while all smart phones
referenced here (iPhones, G2s, and Blackberries) have either
a touch screen or a full keyboard. Further, determining
whether a phone has either a touch screen or a full keyboard
would prove remarkably easy for officers: all one needs to do
is look at the exterior of the phone to determine whether it
holds one of these two features. As phones generally become
more advanced, it seems that more will have either a touch
screen or full keyboard. If this development occurs, then a
photographs that they expected to find. Id. Such investigatory restraint is
commendable and appropriate, and it should be the standard rather than the
exception.
180. Thanks to Professor Gershowitz for helping flesh out this point. While
difficult fact-finding in suppression decisions may not be reason alone to
disregard a rule, in the context of smart phones, fact-finding difficulties are not
the core reason the coding/content-based distinction is inappropriate. Rather, it
is the fact that smart phones are synonymous with computers that drives the
need for a different standard.
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new distinction would not be necessary. Rather, more devices
would be protected against warrantless searches incident to
arrest.
CONCLUSION
The new frontier of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
continues to expand as technology advances. This constant
expansion creates difficulty for courts in applying decades-old
case law to factual scenarios never before considered. One
important challenge in the criminal procedure context
involves the warrantless search of cellular phones by law
enforcement.
Courts in recent years have regularly applied the
warrant requirement's exigent circumstances and search
incident to arrest exceptions when analyzing the legality of
searching cellular phones. The courts that have applied the
exigent circumstances exception have established a
developing legal fiction that information is at a high risk of
loss merely because it exists on a cellular phone. These
courts ignore the reality that most information stored on a
cellular phone will remain there long enough for a warrant to
be secured and that numbers "lost" from recent call lists are
readily obtainable from the service provider. The courts that
have applied the search incident to arrest exception have
generally upheld cellular phone searches. A minority of
courts applying this exception, however, has held that
cellular phones are outside the ambit of the exception's reach
because of their capacity for storing vast quantities of
intimately personal data.
Older generation cellular phones, which are less
comparable to computers than newer devices like iPhones,
still warrant heightened protection because of their capability
for storing very large amounts of private data. For these
phones, a workable standard (and worthwhile compromise to
consider) for searches incident to arrest would allow officers
to view coding information while prohibiting them from
viewing content-based information. Any search of the
content-based information of older generation phones would
require a warrant or a probable cause warrant exception.
Smart phones, defined here as phones containing either a
touch screen or full keyboard (e.g., iPhones, G2s, and
Blackberries), are far more advanced than older generation
2010] 223
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cellular phones. Further, they cannot be logically
distinguished from laptops or other computers in terms of
their functionality and capacity for information storage.
Therefore, the standard for searching smart phones should be
the same standard that applies to laptops and other
computers. Although there is a dearth of search incident
to arrest jurisprudence regarding laptops or personal
computers, various factors indicate that many courts would
invalidate such searches. Likewise, courts should invalidate
the warrantless search of a smart phone if the only basis for
the search is that it was incident to arrest. For computers
and smart phones alike, courts should require that police
obtain a warrant before examining the contents of these
devices.
Courts may well continue to allow warrantless searches
of cellular phones without adopting protective limits. Such a
course would continue the expansion of the search incident to
arrest exception,'' and it would further the erosion of the
warrant requirement. 8 2  If courts instead seek to uphold
basic Fourth Amendment guarantees, however, they must
guard against this potential for widespread intrusion into the
privacy of the citizenry by adopting new standards for
searches of cellular devices. These standards must be
workable, logical, and most importantly-constitutional.
181. See Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to
Search Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POLY REv. 381, 383 (2001) ("Like other
exceptions .... the search incident exception has evolved to swallow the rule, so
much so that the parameters and rationales originating the exception are now
only vaguely recognizable in many decisions of courts across the land." (citing
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)));
Stephen Gibbs, Note, In Search of Straightforward Rules: The Burger Court's
Expansion of the Search Incident to Arrest Exception to the Warrant
Requirement, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1087, 1088 (1982) ("The prevalence of the
search incident to arrest exception and its insulation from judicial examination
indicates that the exception has, in reality, replaced the warrant requirement of
the fourth amendment.").
182. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 582 (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing the
warrant requirement as "unrecognizable" because it has become "riddled with
exceptions"). Rather than steadily eroding, the warrant requirement "has
ridden something of a legal roller coaster," passing through multiple periods of
reverence and contempt over time. James J. Tomkovicz, California v. Acevedo:
The Walls Close in on the Warrant Requirement, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1103,
1104 (1992). As a result of stark ideological opposition between the
requirement's supporters and its detractors, "the warrant tide has ebbed and
flowed" in correlation with the changing face of the Supreme Court over the
years. Id. at 1105.
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